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cmp~RI 
EY6AIMONIA -ITS USE IN GREEK 
Before beginning this discussion of Aristotle's posi-
tion on happiness, we ought first to consider how he and other 
Greek writers have used the word eUOal~OYta and what mean-
ings have been attached to that word and its cognates. Ad-
vancing from the early Greek writers down to Plato and Aris-
totle, we find that the word has undergone some very inter-
esting changes. 
The word itself is etymologically constructed of two 
distinct words, both very frequently employed in Homer, eu 
and Oat~wy. This latter, Liddell and Scott tell us, is of 
the same root as Oato~al, OatYU~l, Oat~; and means "one who 
distributes a part." Hence, oat~wy originally referred to 
anyone. Who gave a share or portion to someone, but was proper-
ly applied to a god who gave those things which men have. oat-
~oye, were all of these gods. Homer calls them ow~~pe~ ~awy.l 
These oat~oye~ were, in general, favorable beings; although 
Homer occasionally speaks of a oat~wy xaxo~, a~uyepo,.2 Grad-
ually, however, by an extrinsic denOmination, the word was 
applied to the part that was given to and was possessed by man. 
1 Ode 8, 325. 
2 Ibid. 5, 396; 10, 634. 
1 
Thus, the word became equivalent to,~opo~. Hector tells 
EVidently these 
refer to the "lot" or "share" or "due." 
The meaning does not remain fixed at this point but 
is further made synonymous with ~6x~, fortune. / Festugiere 
says: 
On lit en meme temps: "Beaucoup ont 
Ie coeur mauvais, mais une bonne fortune": 
chez d'autres, tfle vouloir est bon, 
mais ils gemissent sous Ie poids d'une 
mauvaise fortune A" Ie "distributeur de parts" et la part Distribuee" 
finissent ainsi par sejconfondre avec 
~OX~ • ••• Baq..LOYlal sont dites les 
qualites qu'on tient de la nature 
et que fait triompher Ia Bonne For-
tune (€6~uxra) (Pind. Nem I, 9-10). 
Rlen d'etonnant a voir Aristophane 
unlr comme deux synonymes Bar~CI)Y et 
~6x~: tt selon la part assignee par le 
distributeur divino ou "selon la part 
fortune," c'est meme chose. 4 
Thus we can trace the general evolution of the word: dis-
tributer of parts, the parts distributed, fortune. 
This word in its;primitive use reveals an early ex-
istence of a predominant characteristic of the Greeks, their 
intensely religious, outlook. These gifts were given man by 
the gods, beings greater than him and upon whom he was de-
pendent. Gradually, however, as their simplicity faded, 
3 Ibid. 8,166 
4 Festuglere, A.J., Contemplation et Vie Contemplative Selon 
Platon, Paris, LibraIre Philosophique J. Vrin, 1936: 270. 
2 
the Greeks lost this outlook; and, consequently, the word 
lost its original meaning. First, it was divorced from 
the gods, "a part;" then identified withftchance," "fate," 
"fortune." Only later, as we shall see, did the philosophical 
writers tend to restore the religious significations. Aristo-
tle sees in this "part f' a s€ rOY 't,. 5 
€~Oal~OYra will be found to have a similar evolution 
of meaning. It means "'the good lot ;one has received. tr Fes-
tugiere sees in the word in its earlier development a re-
ligious signification but insists that it shortly lost this 
meaning. 
Et, sans doute, le mot implique, dans 
le principe, une id6e reli~ieuse; 
cette bonne part nous a 6te distribuee 
par la divinite; tout bien, tout mal 
aussi, nous vient des dieux. Mals le 
sens religiuex ne va pas au dela, et 
il ne faut pas encore l'entendre comme une 
habitation de Dieu en nous. 6 
We ask further: in what did this €UOal~OYra consist 
according to various Greek authors. Homer, strange to say, 
does;not use the word, even though he frequently employs its 
constituent parts. In its place he uses the word ~A-
~lO~ to refer to a p~ely material prosperity. To these 
--~-------~-~-------
5 Ethica Nicomachea: ll77b • 
6 Festugiere: Ope Cit. 271. 
3 
material gifts Odysseus refers when he says: ~ar yap t~ 
If is first in the ~o~'e~eAAov tv aVOpaalV~~lO~ eTval .7 ~ Homeric Hymns that e06a'lJ.Ovta occurs. In the address to 
II Athene: xarpe, sea, oo~ O'c!tl~l ~UXT)V euoaltloVlT)V ~e 8 and 
f Ii 
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from the context, we find euoal~ovla is a type of prosperity 
and happiness resulting from the fortunate outcome of an im-
pending war. It is a gift not to one individual, but to the 
people in general, and consists in purely material prosperi-
ty with security from the enemy. The word, moreover, may 
apply to the good lot acquired from working the land as in 
the case of the peasant, Hesiod: 
Add to this the comment made by Robinson: 
Non sunt intelligendae omnes onep~aala(, 
sed eae demum, quae comittuntur con-
tra auspiciorum disciplinam, ut verba 
proxime antecedentia suadent. onep -
~aalaL enim dicuntur quaevis delicta, 
quibus modum 1imites a ratione positos 
transi1imus. 10 
4 
We see, then, that this ia a material good:following, however, 
I --------------------
iiI! 
II ~ 
'i! II 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Ode 18,138 
HOmeric Hymns, 19,5. 
Hesiod: Opera et Dies, 824. 
Robinson, Thomas:~o~OY TOY AZKPAIOY TA EYPIZKOMENA 
e Theatro Sheldonisno, Oxonii, 1'/3'/. p. -;09. Commentary 
to line 827 of the text. 
upon certain moral observances accompanying the working of 
the land. Pindar aSBociates happiness with the honor and 
glory of physical prowess conjoined with the prosperity of 
one's children. 'ronis is evident in his tenth Pythian Ode: 
€06at~wv ~e xat ~~v~~~~ oJ~o~ aVDP ytyve~a, 
o~ av xepatv ~ ~o6wv aQe~~ xpa~~aal~ 
~a ~eYla~'aE9Awv eA~ ~OA~~ ~e xat agevel, 
, N M ~ 
xal ~WhlV E~L Veapov 
, 7- '~M # , #. xa~ alaav 610V 16~ ~oxov~a a~e<pavwv 11091WV. 
5 
However, he also recognized the inability of honor, eating, 
and sensual pleasure to satisfy, thus admitting that some-
thing more is needed. 12 Solon requires a large number of;con-
ditions for one to be happy. The city must be at peace; the 
childre~good and fair to behold; there must be sufficient 
wealth to allow the individual to live according to the norms 
of the day; his death must be glorious; and he must be com-
memorated with national honors. Herodotus quite frankly iden-
tifies eu6al~ovta with wealth, and the eu6at~ove, are those 
who can afford beef, horses, and lamb on the occasion of their 
birthdays.1S ElseWhere, he speaksjof the h~py states which 
fall and the;poor states which rise; thus seeming to mean 
those possessing wealth as contrasted with those in poverty.14 
Thucydides finds no trouble in grouping the eu6at~ove~ among 
11 Pindar: Pythian Odes, x, 22-26 
12 Pindar: Nemean Odes, vii, 8S. 
13 Herodotus: L, l~ 
14 Herodotus: L, 5. 
the rich who were able to afford costly tunics and adorn 
themselves with gold. 15 
It is not until we come to the dramatists that we find 
happiness assuming the form of a moral condition. Sophocles 
says: "They are the happy Who have never known evil."16 That 
this evil is religious can be seen from the rest of the stro-
phe. Jebb interprets crercr9~ geogev as follows: 
Sin, a~a, likened to a storm or earth-
quake, that shak e s a building. When 
a sin has once been cOmmitted, and the 
shock of divine punishment has once been 
felt • • • .17 
Friendship with the gods :occasioned by one's being right-
minded (eu~pwv) seems to be the reason why Aeschylus is not 
C I' " 18 averse to calling yrus euoal~wv aVDP. 
The philosophers are the first really to hit upon the 
notion of happiness as it should be understood according to 
its essence. Plato proposes the question in various places 
but primarily in the Gorgias. There we find him using euoa~­
~ovra very frequently, endeavoring to define it. Of the King 
of Persia he says; ouo~ ~ov ~eyav ~4alAEa ••• e6oat~ova 
ov~a19, and he adds further along in the argument the reasoH: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Thucydides: I,6. 
Sophocles: Antigone, 582 
Jebb, Richard Sophocle~ Plays and Tragedies: Pt. III, An-
tigone. Cambridge: University Press, Note to 583.---
Aeschylus: Persae, 768, 773. 
Plato: Gorgias, 470e 
6 
7 
wealth, power, riches in general are not sufficient to declare 
a man happy. Continuing, he says: 
~ov ~~v yap xaA~v ~~t aya90v avBpa xaf 
yuvarxa euBai~ova e(vai ~~~l, ~ov B~ 
~5lXOV ~ar ~ov~pov a9AlOV. 
Plato allows no doubt to remain about the meaning of euBal-
\-Lovia. Ii. man may have all the wealth in the world; but un-
less he has these virtues, he is not euBai\-Lwv. In his Re-
u ,. y_ # # • public he repeats once more: 0 ye eu ~wv \-Laxap~o~ ~e xal 
euBa£\-Lwv, ~ B~ ~~'~'avav~ia. To this assertion Thrasymachus 
... ~ » t ~. ~, 1 # 
asks: ~W~ yu.p ou; Socrates answers: 0 ~t;V Bl)<.alo~ apa euBal-
t ,» ~, "\ 21 \-Lwv, 0 B aBtxo~ a9Alo~. But to Aristotle is left the task 
of defining the essence of happiness. In his Ethica Nico-
machea he defines euBal~OVra.:: 
~O &v9pw~i vov cl.ya90v wuxiii evepye ta yi ve-
. I' # , ~., , # ~al ~a~ ape~~v, el B~ ~Aelou~ at ape~al, 
~a~a ~~v ~eAe,o~a~~v ~af apicr~~v. 
- , 1 , # # 1 , ~ ,. 23 Elsewhere he says: Boxel B u euBa.l~wV PlO~ xa~ ape~'1v elval. 
In the Politics24 as well as in the Ethics~ euBal~oviais 
identified wi th eu~payr a and e3' i';Tjv. There is no doubt left 
that Aristotle has forsaken the earlier notions of happiness, 
consisting largely in material welfare, and transferred the 
word to its proper sphere, that of activity of the higher part 
--------------------
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Ibid. 
ReKublic: 354a Et • Nrc., l098a 
IOfd.;-!177a 
Politics, l325a , l33lb 
s 
of man. He does not completely divorce e6oa,~ovra from~uXD, 
but makes the latter very secondary. 
All that we have seen can be briefly summarized as fol-
lows. Although originally signifying an internal quality 
d i I' 1 th given by a go or gen us, €uoa,~ov,a ost that meaning by e 
time of the Homeric Hymns and was used by the earlier Greeks 
to represent material prosperity and wealth. Plato and Aris-
totle revived the original notion, an internal condition, 
and crystallized it by Showing it was Virtue, or activity in 
accordance with virtue. They emphasized the intrinsic quality, 
but nowhere do they exclude good fortune. Hence, it ought 
to be said that, with the emphasis placed upon the notion of 
activity, they wed both concepts into the one term: good for-
tune, moral goodness; wealth and weal. 
CHAPTER II 
ARISTOTLE CONCLUDES TO P~PPINESS 
In setting himself the task of exploring the field of 
Politics (which he makes the "master-craft" embracing Ethicsl ), 
Aristotle merely follows in the paths of Greek thought; for 
all the great thinkers from Homer down to his own teacher, 
Plato, considered they had the task of treating this topic. 
Solon, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus are a 
few of the great names associated with this topic. The poets, 
too, had their representatives such as Sophocles, Euripides, 
Aeschylus, Pindar, and Sappho. These mention the topic only 
in passing words; but, nevertheless, their treatment presup-
poses a vast amount of thought on the question. Aristotle, 
in fact, followed every son of Hellas, for each one was con-
cerned with these problems: "\Y.ny do I exist? Why do I have 
the sense of obligation? What is it that I am constantly seek-
ing?" 
For the divining mind of Aristotle, there is little 
hesitancy in answering the question underlying each of these 
problems: man does all this for one purpose, to be happy, to 
1 Eth. Nic. 1094a , 24. "Now it would be agreed that it [the Suo 
preme-nood, the subject of Ethics and Politics] must be the 
object of the most authoritative of the sciences - some 
whience which is pre-eminently a master-craft. But such 
is manifestly the science of Poli tics." 
9 
attain the end for which man exists. 
10 
In the Ethica Nicomachea~ 
i 
with little time spent on the answers to those problems of-
fered by preceding thinkers, he passes on to the answer of-
fered .~hefore but thought out anew for himself. That answer 
is happiness. 
His reason for concluding to the fact that happiness 
must be the answer to these problems faced by Ethics is sol-
idly founded on the principle that everything must have an end. 
Basing his argument on the soundapx~ established by himself in 
the Politics that "nature does nothing in vain,"3 and that this 
object which nature intends must be a good,4 he concludes 
that the good aimed at by one's actions must be a good which 
is desirable in itself and not for something else. It must 
be an ultimate good. This is the case; otherwise, the inten-
tions of the agent would proceed e[~ anelpov. Through an ar-
gumentum ad hominem, it is obvious that this good is happiness; 
though in what it consists, Aristotle must better define. 
This much without further ada, Aristotle is able to say 
about happiness. It fulfills the requirements set down by the 
preliminary argunmnt. It is a good (which all admit) and it 
is ultimate; certainly ultimate or final, for everything 
else that man does is sub-ordinated to it; whereas it is sub-
2 Ibid., l095b , 12-1097a , 14. 
3 Pol.,1253a , 9. (069tV yap ~ ~UOl~ nOlel ~a~~v.) 
4 Ern. ~., l094a , 3. 
ordinated to none. 
Now such a thing happiness, above all 
else is held to be; for this we choose 
always for itself and never for the sake 
of something else, but honour, pleasure, 
reason, and every virtue we choose in-
deed for themselves • • • but we choose 
each of them also for the sake of hap-
piness, judging that by means of them 
we shall be happy.5 
In addition, happiness is self-sufficient, that is, it 
is the most desirable of all goods and lacking in nothing. 
Aristotle conceives of this self-sufficiency as consisting in 
two things. First, that it be perfect happiness irrespective 
of parents, sons, or friends. It is not necessary that these 
persons should have to contribute to the state of happiness 
either by adding some element to that state such as compan-
ionship; or by receiving something from the happy man such as 
wealth, advice, or further learning. On the other hand, it 
must be self-sufficient from the material Side, needing nei-
ther wealth, good-health, nor other material goods except in 
a slight degree for its maintenance. That some are required, 
Aristotle admits, but merely as a condition and not as a cause 
which would enter intrinsically into happiness. 
At this point, it may be mentioned that Aristotle comes 
5 Ibid., l097b ,l. (All translations from Aristotle are those 
made by W.D. Ross.) 
II 
12 
• oharacteristic of happqQpiness insisted upon by Christian 
1.." S Happiness musapst be a status stabilis et qui-~loBOP.u.., • -
-. !ttl!!. in which all deSSesires are supplied and anything 
~d to complement the ~ature of man i. not lacking.7Fur-
.. rao
re
, in his explanatiool-on of the self-sufficiency of hap-
~e8B, Aristotle is mindf~~ul of the fact that happiness is 
.t just one good placed at~~t the side of honors, riches, health, 
14 beauty, but like a cate:e;:::Jegory which includes simultaneously 
.1 of the minor goods. Ju'O'smes A. Stewart8 is partly correct 
I biB analogy of Aristotlee.J.e t s concept of happiness to Plato t s 
~ of Godd. There is a ~ great similarity between the two 
r them• The individual goo~ood has its being only through its 
trt1c1pation in the being ~ of the Form of good. The indivia-
~ elements of happiness bd have their being only because of 
,,11' participation in hapIXlopiness. But Stewart errs in two 
I~ts in claiming Aristotl!~le ~virtually maintains all that Plato 
.-tended for in his doctril~ine of the Idea of the Good." First, 
~art considers happineseee9S as the Form of man. 9 If this were 
r-----.--~--~------
.,-
rat. Thomas Aquinas: S~a Theologica: li2ae , q.4,art.4;art.8. 
liP Bth •. Nic. l097b , 8-22 
.. l£iwart," J .A.: Notes on Q The Nic. Eth., Clarendon Press Ox-,~tord, l892,2vols.: !,9Sg5- 9S.- - , 
,""Ib1d. 95: "It is the Foofi!i'orm and organization of man t s powers 
md opportunities" and e::3 e~5aq10vta. is life." 
13 
true, then Stewart would have to reconcile the contradictory 
notes in Plato's Forms and the rorms or Aristotle. For Plato's 
Forms are subsistent, separated rrom all else,lO whereas Aris-
totle maintains that happiness is a single entity in each in-
dividual and hence numerically multiple. Now, with regard 
to Stewart's contention that h~piness is mants Form, he has 
the problem or explaining how Aristotle could hold that hap-
piness is the rorm or man and at the same time the operation 
or this rorm. For in the rirst book11 we rind that happiness 
is the "activity or the soul in accordance with virtue." In 
Aristotelian language, the soul is the rorm or man. The ac-
tivity or the aoul must be accomplished through some raculty 
or the soul. This raculty and its activity must be accidents 
inhering in the substance and yet really distinct rrom the 
substance. In this case the activity would be an accident, 
distinct rrom the soul, yet inhering in it. Hence, happiness 
is at least once removed rrom the soul and in no wise the soul, 
or rorm, itselr. Supposing, rurther, that stewart were right 
in maintaining that happiness is the soul. He has the addition-
al problem or showing that Aristotle held that the soul was a 
separately existing being, the Form or Idea, such as P~ato would 
hold. 
Stewart is drawn into this discussion or the Form or 
----~---------------
10 Plato: Republic: 5l4a - 51ge • 
11 Eth. Nic. l09sa 17. 
happiness in an endeavor to explain the seemingly difficult 
text12 wherein Aristotle insists that happiness should not 
14 
be reckoned as one among the rest of the goods. A much more 
simple explanation than that offered by Stewart, and one which 
saves Aristotle's other doctrines can be found. Aristotle does 
not claim that the happiness of man cannot be augmented by 
material goods; nor that, entitatively, happiness contains all 
these other goods. He merely wishes to claim for happiness 
the allaying and quieting of man's reasonable desires. 13 
Leaving the discussion as it stands, we pass on to Aris-
totle1s further analysis of happiness. It remains to be seen 
12 Ibid. l097b , 16. e~l ~e naY~mY alpe~~a~~y ~~ cruyap,e~Ou­
~ey~y 6~ 6~AO~ w~ aipe~~epay ~e~a ~ou eAaxicr~ou ~wy ayu-
emy· unepox~ yap ayue~y riye~u, ~~ ~pocr~,ee~eyoy, ayueWy 
6~ ~O ~er~OY atpe~W~ePOY aet: 
13 St. Thomas Aquinas: In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis 
Ad Nicomachum EXtOSit10, Ed. Pirotta-Gliiet, Turin, Italy, 
~rietti, 1934: ec. 9, 115-116. "Aliquid autem dicitur 
etirun solitarium, vel nullo alio connumerato, esse suffi-
ciens, in quantum continet omne illud, quo indiget homo 
ex necessitate. 
"Et sic felicitas de qua nunc loquitur habet de se suffi-
cientiam, quia in se continet illud quod potest homimi 
advenire. Unde potest melior fieri aliquo alio addito. 
Non tamen remanet desiderium hominis inquietum quia desi-
derium ratione regulatum, quale oportet esse felicis, non 
habet inquietudinem de his quae non sunt necessaria, licet 
sunt possibilia adipisci. Hoc est ergo quod dicit maxime 
inter omnia convenire feliCitate, quod etiam ipsa non con-
numerata aliis sit eligibilis. 
"Tamen si connumeretur alicui alteri in minimo bonorum, 
manifestum est, quod erit eligibilior, cuius ratio est 
quia per appositionem fit superabundantia, vel augmentum 
boni. Quanto autem aliquid est magis bonum, tanto est 
eligibile." 
15 
in what the Philosopher believes this final end of man consists; 
what element it is that must be superadded to man's nature 
to call him happy. There are only two steps more to take in 
the positive direction. Then, to conclude his arguments, Aris-
totle, by a negative approach, gives his reasons for refusing 
to accept those quallties which illustrious men before him have 
termed happiness. 
It has already been stated, in discussing Stewart's 
interpretations, that Aristotle considers man's happiness con-
sists in the "active exercise of the soul in conformity with 
excellence or virtue; or, if there be several human excellences 
or virtues, in conformity with the best and most perfect among 
them." NOw, this passage needs further explanation, but first 
we ought to see the principles Aristotle employs to make the 
statement. 
The argument is founded upon man's functions. Since 
the end of a being, Aristotle argues, can be achieved only 
through its operation, the end proper to a being can be as-
certained only from that operation which is proper to the being. 
Now, the only operation or function proper to man and distin-
guishing him from the animals is that of his soul. Therefore, 
happiness should be sought in the use of the faculties of the 
soul. Since each man has those faculties, whether he use them 
or not, each must exercise them to be called happy. He must 
reduce the potencies to actuality and actively produce a new 
16 
being in his make-up. This new being or act is called happiness 
But Aristotle is wisely aware of the fact that, since man pos-
sesses a free will, he is able to use the faculties in a way 
repugnant to his own nature, and thereby render himself un-
happy. This explains why the exercise of the faculty must be 
in conformity with excellence or virtue. So we find that the 
function of the soul, the only faculty proper to man, yields 
h~piness provided that it is used in confommity with the laws 
man's nature demands; or, in other words, in accordance with 
virtue. 
It would be out of place here to discuss how virtue is 
determined and by the use of what means the faculty is brought 
into conformity with virtue. It must be sufficient for the 
present to show why such a conformity is necessary. The facul-
ty, we have seen, must operate according to the nature of man 
in order that the end of man can be achieved. Since virtue 
is the regulation of mants actions so as to make them conform 
with his natUre, it follows logically that the virtue Which 
regulates the action of the highest faculty of man will bring 
that faculty into harmony with his nature and in that way will 
direct the faculty to happiness. 
A further question presents itself to Aristotle's mind 
when he looks at the words,"active exercise" and tithe best 
and most perfect among the virtues." What is this exercise? 
What must be exercised and in confOrmity with which virtue? 
17 
It is in the tenth book of the Ethics that he finally sives 
an answer to these questions. It must be the exercise of the 
intellect of man in conformity with all virtue in contemplating 
truth in Which happiness is to be had. 
That which is proper to each thing is 
by nature best and most pleasant for 
each thing; for man, therefore, the 
life according to reason is best and 
pleasantest, since reason more than 
anything else is man. This life, there-
fore, is also the happiest. 14 
Just how does Aristotle come to the conclusion that 
the life of the intellect is the source of happiness? The 
life of the intellect is the life of the noblest faculty 
of man. The soul in man's body raises him to a level which 
the beasts can never reach. The soul with its own functions 
determines the specific difference between man and brute, 
making man essentially superior. Since, then, the soul and 
its activities are proper to man, it is right that the facul-
ties of the soul be proclaimed the highest. On the other 
hand, the objects of reason are the best of knowable objects. 
They embrace not only sensible objects (known per accidens), 
but also immaterial objects and always under the form of truth. 
Again, intellectual activity is the most continuous and most 
self-sufficient of all man's activities; most continuous "since 
we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can do any-
thing;u15 most self-sufficient, 
------~-------------
for while a philosopher, as well as 
a just man or one possessing any other 
virtue, needs the necessaries of life, 
when they are sufficiently equipped 
with things of that sort the just 
man needs people towards whom and with 
whom he shall act justly, and the tem-
perate man, the brave man, and each of the 
others is in the same case, but the 
philosopher, even when by himself, can con-
template truth, and the better the 
wiser he is; he can perhaps do so better 
if he has fellow workers, but still he 
is the most self-sufficient. 16 
Finally, Aristotle claims that the activity of the intellect 
is the most pleasant of virtuous activit~es. On five scores, 
then, Aristotle pleads his cause for intellectual activity. 
This activity is happiness in view of its own nature, the na-
ture of its object, the continu9ty and self-sufficiency of 
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the action, and, finally, the pleasure accompanying the action. 
In addition, Aristotle settle for us the problem of 
the objectum formale of reason in its enjoyment of happiness. 
In the tenth book of the Ethics he says: 
16 Ibid. 
If happiness is activity in accordance 
with virtue, it is reasonable that it 
should be in accordance with the high-
est virtue; and this will be that of the 
best thing in us. Whether it be reason 
or something else that is this element 
which is thought to be our natural 
ruler end guide and to take thought 
of things noble and divine • • • the 
activity of this in accordance with 
its proper virtue will be perfect hap-
piness. That this activity is contem-
plative we have already aaid. 17 
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As this statement stands, Aristotle merely proves that con-
templation is happiness. If we remember, however, his dis-
cussion in the sixth book concerning intellectual virtues, we 
can see that it is philosophic wisdom; for there he says: 
But again it [practical wisdom] is not 
supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e., 
over the superior part of us, any more 
than the art of medicine is over health. 18 
A paraphrase of these two quotations will clarify Aristotle's 
position. The argument would run something like this if ar-
ranged in a sorites. "Practical wisdom is not superior to 
philosophic wisdom; therefore, philosophic wisdom is the 
highest activity. But, contemplation is philosophic wisdom; 
therefore, contemplation is the highest activity. Now, if 
the highest activity is h~piness, then, contemplation is 
happiness. tf Hence, to be happy, a man must contemplate both 
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scientific knwledge and intuitive intelligence as regards the 
things of the most exalted nature; he must ~not only know what 
follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth 
about the first principles;,,19 he must be a lover of wisdom, 
a philosopher, who does not hesitate to embrace as matter of 
consideration all the realms of being; he must search out the 
fonts of knowledge, grasp hold of the formal, material, ef-
ficient, final, and exemplary causes of all things and examine 
them. 
-~-------~---------~ 
18 Ibid. 114Sa, 6. 
19 Ibid. 1141a, 16. 
We are in a position now to point out in a few words 
an accurate description of happiness. This Zeller has done 
for us. 
The happiness of man can, in fact, consist 
only in his activity, or more accurately 
in that activity which is p~oper to him 
as man. What kind of activity is this: 
Not the general vital activity, which 
he shares even with plants; not the sen-
sitive activity, which belongs to the 
lower animals as well as to man; but the 
activity of reason. Now the activity of 
reason, in so far as it is rightly per-
formed, we call virtue. The proper hap-
piness of man consists, therefore, in 
virtuous activity or, in as much as there 
are several sueh, in the noblest and most 
perfect of these. But this is the theo-
retic or pure activity of thought. For 
it belongs to the noblest faculty and 
directs itself to the highest object; 
it is exposed to the least interruption, 
and affords the highest pleasure; it is 
least dependent on foreign support and 
external expedients; it is its own aim 
and object, and is valued purely for its 
own sake; in it man arrives at rest and 
peace, while in the military and poli-
tical, or in the practical life generally, 
he is ever restlessly pursuing ends which 
lie outside the activity itself. Reason 
is the Divine in us. It is the true es-
sence of the man. The pure activity of 
reason can alone perfectly accord with his 
true nature. It alone can afford him 
unconditional satisfaction, and raise 
him above the limitations of humanity 
into the life of God. Next to it comes 
moral activity, which thus constitutes 
the second essential element of happiness. 
Inasmuch, however, as it is the Divine 
in man which is called into exercise 
in thought, the latter may be regarded 
as a superhuman good; whereas moral virtue 
is in an especial sense the Good of Man. 2l 
--------------------21 Zeller, Edward: Aristotle And The Earlier Peripatetics, 
tr. by Costelloe, Mu!rfiead;-London, Longmans,Green, 1897; 
v. 2 141-144. 
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CHAPTER III 
ARISTOTLE CONSIDERS ADVERSARIES 
Aristotle, as we have seen, arrives at the conclu 
sion that happiness must consist in the active operation 
of the highest of man's faculties in accordance with virtue, 
and that this operation is proper to the intellect in con-
templation of truth. This can be put down as the thesis ex-
pounded and proved in the Nicomachean Ethics. But he knows 
that the ~estion is left incompletely handled unless he con-
siders those men who have set up other standards of happiness 
contrary to his own. Hence, he must cohsider each of the major 
adversaries to his thesis and reject them one by one. Among 
these, the most famous is Plato to whom Aristotle devotes most 
time. Plato had evolved a system which contained flaws and 
imperfections. To these imperfections, Aristotle has recourse 
in his refutation. 
The great leader of the Academy had, from the beginning, 
concerned himself with ethical questions: the problems of right 
and wrong, justice, pleasure, the state as the protector of 
human welfare and happiness. In the endeavor to settle the 
problems which arose, Plato had recourse to his system commonly 
referred to as the Ideas or Forms. To understand and appre-
ciate Aristotle's ar~ents, one must first get some notion of 
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what Plato meant and intended by his Ideas or Forms - a task 
which is none too easy because Plato himself was not altogether 
clear, and because Platonic interpretations of the Academy 
have colored our underst~ding of its leader's meaning. But 
we shall try to become acquainted with the fundamental notes 
of the Ideas from the primary sources, Plato's own words. 
First, then, why did Plato construct such a system? 
Throughout all of his discussions, certain fundamental pro-
blems constantly recurred: the problem of the one and the many, 
that of becoming and being, the unity of being, the concepts 
of Justice end Good. Furthermore, he had the epistemological 
difficulties of knowledge, reality, learning, sensation, and 
intellection. He faces, in the ~, the problem of education 
and the mind's ability to grasp reality. As a test case, So-
crates asks Meno for a definition of virtue. For an answer, 
he receives an enumeration and description of virtue in a 
man, woman, child, slave, and "many others." Socrates notes 
the fact that this is not definition but merely a catalogue. 
He WaRts essences. Again, in the Phaedo the question arises 
whether our sense are trustworthy. This Simmias denies. "How, 
then," asks Socrates, "does the mind attain to truth? To what 
is the mind adaequated that it may be sure it knows externals2" 
To all of these answers there is only one solution for Plato -
the Forms. 
What, then, does Plato consider to be the notes of the 
Forms? In no place does he actually in a systematic scheme 
give us this information as Aristotle would. But he gives the 
notes when discussing various virtues. As a by-product of 
the Symposium, Plato seeks to know what beauty is and claims 
that it is an Idea. Then he describes this Idea as follows: 
First always existing and neither cOming 
to be nor being destroyed, neither in-
creasing nor waning, secondly not beau-
tiful in one way and base in another, 
nor beautiful in one aspect and base in 
another, nor beautiful now and base 
again so that it is beautiful to some 
and base to others; nor again to one 
(initiated) would the beautiful appear 
as a guise, as hands or any other part 
which the body shares, nor as a descrip-
tion or knowledge, nor as being somehow 
or other in another, as in a living 
being or in the earth, or in the heaven 
or in some other thing, but being itself, 
in itself, with itself, a single form 
always existing, and all other beauti-
ful things sharing in it in some such 
way that although the other things be-
come and are destroyed in no wise does 
it bec~me more or less or suffer any-
th1tng. 
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In no other place does Plato list so many notes of the Essences. 
First, we find that eternity and immutability are absolutely 
necessary to the Forms. They are, in all respects, unchangeable 
The necessity of this note can be easily appreciated when one 
remembers that problems of change and stability must be answered 
Again, the beautiful must be wholly beautiful, "wi thout blemish 
1 Symposium: 2lla, f. (All translations of Plato are those 
made by Jowett.) 
24 
or stain;" it must be beautiful at all times, in all places 
end for all beholders. It must be an absolutely existent being, 
whose existence is separated from all other beings, and it 
must have no contact with the individual Wherever it may chance 
to exist. Furthermore, the individual beings obtain their 
entity from a participation in these Forms. Plato does not 
state definitely what this participation is although in the 
Symposium he claims it is ~eee~lq. In the Phaedo2 he tells us 
that this sharing may happen in three ways: through ~apouora, 
or actual presence of the Form in the individual, ~eee~l', and 
, )('OlVCJ.)Vl<l.. 
In addition, as Plato indirectly states in many of the 
dialogues, the Ideas have a threefold aspect: ontological, 
teleological, and logical or epistemological. The first con-
cerns the objective reality of the Ideas. They are actual, 
real substances3 existing separated from everything else. That 
they are substances there can be no doubt; for besides the 
passages just referred to in the Phaedo and Republic, Plato 
gives us in the Phaedrus4 the beautiful allegory of the plea-
sure the gods have while observing the Essences (ouotal). 
These essences exist in the highest part of heaven, and the 
2 Phaedo: IOOd. 
3 IbId: 78d; Repub., 514a, ff. 
I Phaedrus: 247a, ff. 
25 
happiness of the gods consists in the clarity with which they 
contemplate these Essences. Man, too, strives to view these 
beings; but, because of the jogging of the horses and chariots, 
he gets only an imperfect knowledge of the Essences. Man falls 
to earth where knowledge consists in ava~v~al~, a remembering 
or recollection of What had been seen in the heavens in a pre-
vious life. There can be no doubt that thus the Ideas are on-
tological beings; in truth, they are substances existing se-
parated from all other beings, even separated from themselves. 
This last Plato reiterates in the Parmenides. 
With respect to the epistemological side of the Ideas, 
we see in this same passage of the Phaedrus, along with the 
discussion of learning propounded in the Meno5, that growth 
in knowledge is a matter of remembering what man has seen in 
his pre-natal state of existence where, without the body, the 
soul beheld the Essences or Ideas. Plato tells us that hap-
piness consists in the clear vision of these Ideas, in the 
knowledge and contemplation of justice, love, truth, and good 
in general. For in the Phaedo we are told that death is a boon 
to the philosopher, and that the pursuit of philosophy is but 
a practice for death. And when death comes, it is merely an 
introduction to a life of happiness Which consists in renewed 
contemplation of the Ideas. 
The third aspect of the Forms is teleological. Briefly, 
6 Meno: 81c, ff. 
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dized, nevertheless, he boldly pronounoed his decisions. 
Taney's law practice in Frederick continued to grow, so that he was 
able, after five years, to marry and establish a home of his own in Frederi~ 
He married Anne Phoebe Key, siter of Francis Soott Key. The Taney home, 
while not at all pretentious, still stands today on Bentz Street. 26 On the 
front of the house, near the doorway, is a tablet, bearing this inscription: 
In This House Lived 
Roger Brooke Taney 
Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court 
of the United States 
and his Wife, 
Anne Key Taney, 
Sister of 
Francis Scott Key 
Author of 
"The Star-Spangled Banner" 
The Taney home was a happy and harmonious one. The marriage was " a 
happy and most tortunate" one for Taney. "It seems probabl~, in vi~ of his 
fragile health and easily shattered nervous system, that his long life and 
professional achievements would have been impossible without the solicitous 
care and devotion of his wife and daughters who were born to them.n27 That 
Taney loved his family and home is Shown by his frequent letters to his 
wife and children. He also referred to them in letters to others. The 
26nOn April 15, 1930, the home of Roger Brooke Taney in Frederick, Md., was 
opened as a national shrine. •• Already the little home, with its quaint 
old wine cellar and slave quarters, has been visited by thousands ot tour-
ists from all parts of the United States. Within the first few weeks vis-
itors also registered from Germany, Sootland, China, and Denmark." Delal-
paine, Edward S., "Visiting the Taney Home", Nation~!Republic, Vol. 18, 
Sept., 1930, 20. 
27Swisher, 50. 
find that there are at least three notes proper to good: it 
is the object of desire; it is self-sufficient; and it is 
measure. With regard to the first, Plato tells us that it is 
the goal of all wish, action, and art. 
For the sake of good, then, those who 
do, do all these things ••• fhere-
fore, do we admit that we do not want 
that which we do for the sake of some-
thing, but that we want the thigg for 
which we do it,?7 
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If you recall, we think that all things 
ought to be done for the sake of the good • • • 
and do you agree with us that the end of 
all deeds is the good, and that for 
its sake all other things should be 
done and not it for the sake of the 
rest? Yes. 8 
It is the object of all nature and desired by all types of 
being: the rational, the irrational, the animal, the plant, 
by the whole universe. Plato begins by asking for the good 
that man desires and ends up by claiming that the entire 
world with all its categories of being seeks it. He becomes 
more definite in the Philebus when he says that "every in-
telligent being pursues it the good desires it, wishes to 
catch it and get possession of it."9 From these passages there 
can be little doubt that Plato considered the good as the 
ultimate end of man, even though he may not state the fact as 
clearly as Aristotle does. 
The second note proper to the good is self-sufficiency. 
----------------~---7 Gorgias: 468b. 
8 Ibid. 49ge. 
9 Philebus: 20d. 
Again in the;Philebus Plato writes: 
Must the class of good be perfect or not 
perfect? Certainly, the most perfect of 
all things, Socrates. But in what? Is 
the good sufficient? How can it be other-
wise? And in this it surpasses all other 
things. lO 
By the notion of self-sufficiency, Demos tells us Plato in-
tends 
a causal category; to be self-sufficient 
is to be master of one's destiny. The 
good man ia unaffected by the vicissi-
tudes of life even by the death of those 
nearest to him (Repub. 387d). He is in-
dependent of his surroundings; as far 
as is possible to man, his actions as 
his beliefs are self-determined. The 
immortal soul moves, but is not moved 
by, other things; it is self-moving. 
Self-sufficiency is also a formal no-
tion. To be self-sufficient is not to 
require anything else and so to be de-
finite. Thus worth consists in "in-
itselfness" or self-hood. Now, in so 
far as sonsthing is definitely "this" 
and not "that, II it is really real. 
The notion of self~sufficiency merges 
into that of the really real. In sum, 
worth attaches to being, sim~liciter; 
and anything, in so far as 1 really is, 
is good. It is good to be. ll 
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We referred to the good as being the measure of all 
things. This characteristic takes us back to the teleological 
aspect of the Forms. In Plato's scheme of "creation," the 
good is the supreme Idea, the pattern and the cause of 811 
beings beneath it. God, in this scheme, must make creatures 
10 Ibid. 
11 Demos: Ope Cit. 53. 
in conformity with the pattern of good. Furthermore, Plato 
maintains that the Ideas suffer no influence or change beeause 
they are absolutely independent of the world and of them-
selves. Therefore, this would hold true of the Idea of good. 
On the other hand, the good is the cause of man's cognitions 
end intellection in an efficient way because it is the cause 
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of the shadows within the cave. Finally, it is toward the Idea 
that man turns in an endeavor to grasp truth and perfect real-
ity. It is man's nature not to spend his entire life gazing 
at the shadOWS, but rather to tear himself away from them and 
turn towards the bright true light of the good. Thus, we find 
summed up in this locus classicus12 the three large aspects 
of the Idea of good - the ontological, the logical, and the te-
leological. 
In the sixth book of the Republic we find them again 
mentioned. There, in discussing knowledge, Socrates builds 
up his explanation upon an analogy between the sun and sen-
satIons; the good and intellectual perception. 
12 
13 
Is it not also true that the sun is 
not Vision, yet as being the cause 
thereof is beheld by vision itself • 
• • • ThiS, then, you must understand 
as what I meant by the offspring of 
the good which the good begot to stand 
in a proportion with itself: as the 
good is in the intelligible region to 
reason and the objects of reason, so 
is this in the visible world to vision 
~d the objects of vision. 13 
Re1ub: 514aO 519c. Ib d. 508b. 
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After stating the similarity between the function of the Form 
of good and the sun, Socrates proceeds to a fuller explanation 
of the work of the good. 
This reality, then, that gives their truth 
to the objects of knowledge, and the power 
of knowing to the knower, you must say 
is the idea of good, and you must con-
ceive it as being the cause of know1ege 
and of truth in so far as knoWR; 14 
This much Plato has to say about the Form of good with its 
epistemological reference to manls intellect. Note, however, 
that underlying the entire explanation is a:presupposition 
that the Form of good, just like the sun, is a real being exist 
ing independently of the mind. This same note is sounded 
again when Plato brings up the matter of the Form causing the 
reality of the individual beings. 
The sun, I presume you will say, not only 
furnishes to visib1es the power of visi-
bility, but it also provides for their 
generation and growth and nurture though 
it is not itself generation •••• In 
like manner, then, you are to say that 
the objects of knowledge not only receive 
from the presence of the good their being 
known, but their very existence and essence 
is derived to them from it, though the 
good itself is not essence but still 
transcends essence in dignity and surpassing 
power. 1S 
There can be little doubt that Plato relied upon the doctrine 
~~--------------~--
14 Ibid. 508e. 
15 reId. 509c. 
of the Ideagf good to explain his theory of morality, govern-
ment, cosmology, epistemology and ontology. He has insisted 
constantly upon the absolute existence of the essences, upon 
their causal aspect of man-kind in the fields of mental and 
extra-mental reality. It might be well to mention that cause 
should not be taken as the efficient cause, for nowhere is 
Plato clear enough for us to draw that conclusion. There is a 
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temptation to claim such causality for the Idea of good, but 
two difficulties stand in the way. The word cause can be taken 
in the sense of exemplary cause at all times, and the quality 
of efficient causality is attributed by Plato to the O~~lOUPYO~. 
With this explanation behind us, the examination of 
Aristotle's arguments for rejecting ~ato's doctrine mew pro-
ceed. In the Ethics Aristotle presents three main objections 
to Plato. The first, to which there are three parts, is based 
on the transcendental nature of the concept of gpod; the second, 
on the uselessness of the separately existing Form of good; and 
the third, on the unattainability of a transcendent good. 
With regard to the first, we must bear in mind what we 
said above, namely, that the Idea of good is a unity, remaining 
unchangeable. It must not take in several diff~rent types of 
good. For did not Plato object to Meno's catalogue of goods? 
The first part, then, of this argument presented in syllogistic 
form would run: the concept of good contains in it an order of 
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priority and posteriority. But the Platonic doctrine of the 
Idea does not conaain such an order. Therefore, the Platonic 
doctrine of the Form does not agree with the concept of good; 
and, as a result, the Form as Plato conceives it does not exist. 
Aristotle's proof of his major is very simple. There is prior-
ity and posteriority between substance and accidents, the being 
which exists in itself, and the being Which exists in some-
thing else. But good can be predicated of both substance and 
accidents. Therefore, the concept contains in it an order of 
priority and posteriority. With regard to the minor, Aristotle 
appeals to Platonic doctrine and gives an immediate proof with 
regard to the lack of a single Idea for numbers. It must be 
noted, however, that Aristotle means a particular type of num-
ber. It is the Ideal number of which Aristotle says that they 
stand in essential and immutable succession to and dependence 
on each other; and, therefore, can be brought under no common 
Idea. 16 
In the second part of the argument Aristotle alters his 
view point slightly and takes as his cue Plato's insistence 
upon the unchangeableness of the Idea. A single and universal 
concept, Aristotle says, may not be predicated of more than 
one category. But the concept of the good transcends all the 
categories. Therefore, the concept of good is not a single, 
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universal concept. For a proof to this major, which Aristotle 
here presupposes, we must turn to another work of his, the 
Metaphysics, where he insists that A6yo~ (universal definition) 
IllUS t be unchanging and always of the same comprehension. 
There is no destruction of the formula in 
the sense that it is ever in course of 
being destroyed ••.•• If then demonstration 
is of necessary truths and definition 
is a scientific process, and if ••• 
demonstration and definition cannot vary 
thus, ••• clearly there can neither 
be definition of nor demonstration about 
sensible individuals. 17 
Now in predicating the universal good of sUbstance and quality 
(universality is basic to definition), the concept must undergo 
a "destruction," at least in the note oOf "inseity" or "inalei ty.' 
Hence such a universal concept is impossl. ble. His minor stands 
proven in the fir st part of the argument and again we find the 
conclusion that the Ideas are impossible. 
The final argument in this group, based upon the uni-
versality of concepts, proceeds in the following manner. A 
single idea must be the object of a single science. But the 
Idea of good is not a single idea, for it is not the object 
of a single science. Therefore, there is no Idea of good. Of 
the two premises here used, the second is easier to grasp, for 
evidently the good can be the object of Ethics, Politics, flute-
p~aying, and so on through all the fields of science. As for th 
17 ~: 1039b , 20 - 1040&, 7. 
first premise, a good bit of doubt overshadows it. It is 
true that the science of every universal idea has its own for-
mal object. But this does not mean that it might not be in-
cluded in the field of another science. The sciences of 
ship-building, carpentery, shoe-making, strategy, and human 
conduct - each the possessor of its own formal object - is 
possessed by the science of Politics. 18 P1~to is not unlike 
Aristotle in this; for admitting the individual fields of 
science, he would still form a super-science (~EXVD apXl~ex­
~OVlX~) Which he calls dialectics embracing all inferior 
sciences.19 The argument, therefore, would not seem to do 
, justice to Plato and is itself inconsistent with Aristotle s 
other ideas. 
The second major argument rests on the fmtility of such 
a sye tem. It may be claimed, that Platonists might say, that 
there is a difference between the Idea of good, which is ab-
solute, and the individual goods in the wprld; that the uni-
versal good is more an object of the aya~~a~ov ~rov simply 
because it is more enduring. But Aristotle shows that no 
matter how much more lasting it be, it is still notgenerically 
------------~------~ 18 Eth. Nic.: 1094a , 1-17; 30. 
19 Grent~lexander: The Ethics of Aristotle Illustrated with 
Essays and Notes, Longmens, Green and Co., London, l87~ 
v 1, 43g;- "This argument is certainly unsatisfactory if 
applied to Plato's point of view. Plato would say dialec-
tic is the science of the Idea of good, and in this all 
other science find their meeting-point. Even of the ~pax­
~ov a~eov it might be said that according to Aristotle's 
own account it falls (in all its manifestations, whether 
as means or ends) under the one supreme science - Politics." 
different. The White is not whiter because it is more en-
during. If this is the only argument that can be brought 
up in the defense of the Ideas, then they are useless and it 
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is futile to defend them. For the result would be that, since 
there is no difference between the two, between the absolute 
and phenomena, there is no need of multiplying beings unneces-
sarily. Hence, we might s~ that Aristotle's argument in this 
case is founded upon the principle of "sufficient reason." 
There must be a sufficient reason for every being's existence 
which is not found in the Form of good. Therefore, there 
should not be an unnecessary multiplication of beings by postu-
lating the existence of the Idea of good. 
Furthermore, taking the objects of this Form of good, 
there seams to be a great discrepancy_ For the Form of good 
does not embrace all good in the same way. Some are called 
good because of their relation to the formal good. Hence, 
these latter would be called good by analogy, either by the 
similarity they have to the good or by their relation either 
as cause or effect of the good. In this case, the Idea is 
not a perfect unity and cannot be posited as the object of man's 
activity. 
Finally, Aristotle says that the Idea of good is useless 
for man; for, as Plato admits, it is an absolute reality, sep-
arated from all individuals. Now the final end of man is the 
acquisition and possession of happiness. If, howe~er, the 
good cannot be possessed, it is a useless and and not, in 
any way, to be put down as man's objective. 
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We can see, then, the different aspects under which 
Aristotle objects to the Ideas. First, it is not ontologically 
possible; secondly, it is logically impossible; third, it is 
useless in the science of Ethics. The;objection he raises in 
regard to the formal object of science seems to me to carry 
little weight, because he does not consider Plato on his own 
grounds. His metaphysical arguments are sound; but they can 
hardly be pronounced original. Plato brings out the useless-
ness of the Form for man's cognition and thus approaches the 
last of Aristotle's arguments. He also criticizes them on 
the point of multiplying beings unnecessarily. Parmenides 
forces Socrates into the admission that there would have to be 
an infinite number of Ideas. 
But so much for Plato and Aristotle. There are other 
objections the la $t~!"r' must handle, but this is done easily 
and quickly. Several qualities or activities of man were se-
lected by various men in which must happiness be s aid to exist. 
Such are pleasure, riches, honor, virtue, and health. With a 
brief consideration of each, Aristotle drops them by the way-sidE. 
Pleasure must be discarded, because it is a life suited for cat-
tle and because it is not in accordance with the higher facul-
ties of man. Honor is too superficial, for it depends upon 
those Who confer the honor; nor is it a good proper to the 
possessors fva ~La~euawal £au~oo~ ayaeoo~ eTvaL.19 Also,it 
is only a means, at best, of being sure that one possesses 
virtue. Virtue, itself, cannot be happiness; for, as we have 
seen, it is a habit and may be possessed while asleep. In 
addition, a virtuous man in suffering misery and misfortune 
would not be accounted happyl 
With this, Aristotle has completed his defense of hap-
piness as he understands it. With the philosophers who have 
preceded him, he disagrees either because of their superfici-
ality or because of the inherent difficulties with their sys-
tem. After discarding their proposals, he offers his own 
answer to the perennial difficulty, backing it up with solid 
proof. 
19 ~. ~.: l095b , 27. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ARISTOTLE MAKES HAPPINESS CONTEMPLATION 
The last two chapters have dealt with Aristotle's method 
of arriving at the conclusion that the final end of man is hap-
piness. This treatment has Shown how he concludes to the same 
doctrine as the thinkers who have preceded him. It also shows 
how Aristotle, differing in his method of discussion, comes 
to his conclusion by the use of metaphysical argumentation. 
Ignoring the arguments drawn from custom and universal persua-
sion, but employing the principle of finality with respect to 
the functions of man, he concludes that happiness is man's 
final end. In addition, with this same argument, he proves 
that happiness is not a matter of superficial enjoyment of 
money, pleasure, leisure, health, or freedom from worry; nor 
that it is Plato's Form of good; but that it is the operation 
or "active exercise of the soul in accordance with virtue, or 
if there are several, in accordance with the highest of these." 
Now it remains to analyse this definition to find out 
wnat meaning Aristotle places in each of the words he includes 
in it. We shall begin with the major division and work to its 
fine points. The first to be treated will be "activity;" then 
n soul;" next "virtue fI and the type s of vir tue; finally, "'in 
accordance wi th t he highest virtue. tt When this has been done, 
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we can say that we have made an honest attempt to enter into 
Aristotle's mind and understand the depth of his thought on 
this greatest of all moral problems. Then, only one thing re-
mains - to evaluate, in some degree, Aristotle's entire thesis 
under the light of later philosophical and theological doctrines. 
To begin, we must consider the expression, Itactive exer-
cise. 1t This active exercise, or activity, constitutes the 
generic aspect of Aristotle's definition. By this phrase he 
wishes to distinguiSh happiness from mere existence. Happiness 
is not mere ~, actus primus, but actio, actus secundus. 
A man does not fulfill his purpose in life by merely existing. 
He must make use of this existence in some type of activity. 
The case is similar to the three men in Scripture who received 
the talents. He who buried his was satisfied with existence. 
The two who used theirs with good results received the rewara. 
The first got only reproach and condemnation. So, too, Aris-
totle wishes to show that existence is insufficient. 
In addition, by activity Aristotle does not mean 50va-
~l~ or mere faculty. 
, # He intends evepyela which is the actus 
secundus of the faculty. If the faculty were dormant, the pro-
blem would resolve again into one of mere existence - useless. 
Therefore, the conclusion is that the 50va~l~ must become 
Evepyela. Happihess must be something vital, living, non-dor-
mant. It is well to note that happiness is not truth; but is 
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the act of a being in possessing this truth. The latin, 
possessio veritatis, brings out the idea because £ossessio not 
only denotes having ~ thing but also connotes the active having, 
the activity on the part of the possessor in holding onto the 
object possessed. It is the difference between ~ possessa 
and possessio ~, between the active voice and the passive 
voice. 
There Bre, however, various types of activity; but only 
one which can be called happiness. For this reason, Aristotle 
insists that it must be found in the soul of man. Happiness 
must be found in the part of man which differentiates man from 
the beast. With this word he excludes the pleasures that may 
be had by the activity of the body. Exercise, com£ort, food, 
the procreative act, all yield pleasure; but they do not con-
stitute happiness. There is more in happiness than these can 
give; something that calls upon the soul and which will con-
stitute human happiness, not animal pleasure. It may be noted 
here that these animal pleasures are not mocked by Aristotle. 
In fact, he recognizes that they can increase happiness but only 
in an accidental and entirely unessential way. But happiness 
is in the higher part of man and is an accidens proprium of man 
provided that man fulfills the conditions required. 
Aristotle includes the term virtue among the essential 
notes of happiness. Then he defines and distinguishes it. 
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There are several virtues, he tells us. Virtues of the mind 
and virtues of the will; intellectual virtues and moral virtues. 
Are all of these to be implied in the words of the definition? 
It cannot be said that Aristotle holds they must. It would 
be only a matter of interpreting the general trend of Aristo-
telian thought if we maintained that Aristotle intended all the 
virtues to be included. For he expressly states that happiness 
mus~ ~e in accordance with the highest virtue. However, it 
would seem to be against that same general trend if we excluded 
all the virtues except the highest. Eor Aristotle is seeking 
the perfect man and the perfect man must have all virtues. 
The division of virtues has been mentioned: the moral 
virtues, which pertain to the will, and the intellectual virtues 
Which pertain to the acquisition of truth. He defines moral 
virtue ~pe~~ ~alX~) as a state of character concerned with 
choice, lying in a mean. l Moral virtues is a esl' which facili-
tates, by reason of the repetition, the performance of good acts 
acts in harmony with the nature of man. The~, or that which 
is good for man, is to be debermined by practical wisdom about 
which we shall shortly speak. 
The intellectual virtues (ape~~ OlaYO~lx~) are states 
of mind concerned with knowing truth; and the list of these 
virtues is established by the objectum formale of their activity 
--------------------
1 ~.!!£. 1107a , 1. 
Thus, they can be classified under the following headings: 
practical truth, or 10lowledge of how to secure the ends of hu-
man life; art, or knowledge of how to mrure things; intuitive 
reason, or knowledge of the principles from which science pro-
ceeds; science, or demonstrative knowledge of the necessary 
and eternal; and philosophic wisdom, the union of intuitive 
reason and science. 2 
Aristotle has an excellent reason for discussing virtue 
and for including all of the types in the definition of hap-
piness. Through free will it is possible for man to use the 
faculties not only xa~a ~UcrlV but also ~apa ~UcrlV. Happiness 
must be an activity xa~a ~ucrll;and, since virtue is xa~a ~UcrlV 
while vice napa ~U~lV, happiness must be in accordance with 
virtue. In this way, Aristotle shows that the ultimate end 
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of man is in harmony with man's nature. This phrase, "in accor-
dance with," sets the standard or norm by which man is to opel"ate 
and function. 
Moral virtues are to enter into happiness in the function 
of hand-maidens. Temperance, courage, even-temper are the 
mind's helpers. \Vhen one practices them, the intellect is un-
shackled from the earthiness usually attributed to men. It is 
the function of moral virtue to 'nsure the smooth and unimpede d 
operation of the intellect by removing the internal personal 
obstacles in the character. 
--------------------
2 Eth. Nic. 1139b , 15 - 1141a, 19. 
Intellectual virtues, on the other hand, have a function 
in happiness proper to each phase of truth. Happiness must 
be found in the good state of the mind. Now, Aristotle tells 
us that trof the intellect which is contemplation, not practical 
nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity 
respectively.u3 To insure the good state of the intellect, that 
is, to insure truth, it is necessary to use the intellect with 
certain rules of logic (which Aristotle sets forth in his Ana-
lytica Priora and Posteriora). It is the function of all the 
intellectual virtues to apply these rules and principles of 
thought. But each virtue has its own proper function in hap-
piness. As stated above, there ~e five virtues of the mind: 
practical wisdom, art, science, intuitive reason, and philo-
sophic wisdom. The purpose of practical wisdom is to supply 
the knowledge of the mean in determining the moral virtues. 
-
This is to what he refers when Aristotle defines moral virtues 
by saying: 
Birtue, then, is a state of char~cter con-
cerned with choice lying in a mean, i.e., the 
mean relative to us, this being determined by 
a rational principle, and by that principle 
by which themsn of practical wisdom would 
determine it.4 -
It is the part of pr~ctical wisdom to determine and appoint 
the middle between the two extremes involved in every virtue. 
Thus it can be said that practical wisdom or prudence 
--------------------3 Ibid~ 1139a,27~ 
4 Ibid. 1107a , 1. 
is secondary to the higher faculty of philosophic wisdom, be-
cause Aristotle conceives of prudence as a hand-maid. It is 
the purpose of prudence to claar away in:ternal difficulties 
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to give the other faculty time and opportunity to achieve its 
own end. By helping man to accomplish his internal functi?ns, 
overcome his ~nternal difficulties and this in as smooth and 
efficient way as possible, more leisure will be accorded con-
templation. Theophrastus has brought out this operation of 
prudence very well in a fragment preserved by one of the 
schomiasts and reprinted by Burnet. 
Prudence bears itself to wisdom as 
the slaves of the masters, who have 
the care of everything, are related 
to the despots; for these do every-
thing that must be done in the house 
in order that their masters may have 
leisure for their free pursuits, while 
prudence accomplishes all the practical 
thingsin order that wisdom may have 
time for the contemplation of the most 
refined things. 5 
Next, it is the function of art to supply the necessarie 
of life. One must remember that art is here used not for the 
knowledge of painting, music, and sculpture, the so-called 
fine arts, alone •. It refers to any activity that has transient 
action as its aim. Hence, it means carpentery, baking, shoe-
making, as well as flute-playing and dancing. Now, art fits 
into the scheme of happiness by providing the leisure necessary 
for contemplation. As the moral virtues under the dictates of 
--------------------
5 Burnet~ John: The Ethics bf Aristotle, London, Methuen and Co. l~OO 50~114~a a footnote. 
practical reason remove all the obstacles to contemplation 
which may be found in one's character, or emotional or volun-
tary mru{e-up, so too, art removes all the obstacles which may 
exist in the environment. For example, it provides 'the food, 
clothing, and physical care of the body which may be necessary 
for sound intellectual operation. It keeps the individual 
out of penury and misery. In this way, art insures smooth 
operation by eliminating external distraction. 
Science and intuitive reason must combine to present 
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the ideae objectivae for contemplation. It is the purpose of 
these two virtues to amass, so to speak, the great body of 
truth which the last faculty will contemplate. Intuitive rea-
son has the task of collecting all the primitive truths; While 
science will draw certain conclusions about necessary beings 
by reasoning from the primitive truths. Finally, these virtues 
arragge this body of truth into one unified system - ~ master-
piece. 
Aristotle inserts a conditional clause into his defini-
tion: "if there are several virtues, in accordance with the 
highest." There are, as we have seen, several virtues of the 
soul. Now we must find the application of this conditional 
clause. Aristotle means by this, that, although all virtue 
is necessary to h~piness, the essential virtue is that of 
philosophic wisdom. He says that happiness must be in accor-
dance with the higheat virtue. The reason is that happiness 
must be the highest end and the rational place to posit hap-
piness would be in the operation of the highest faculty. Now, 
philosophic wisdom is the highest of the virtues "for philo-
sophic wisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive 
reason, of the things that are the highest by nature."S It 
contains the matter that the intellect will;contemplate as a 
finished product, perfect in all its detall and unified into 
one whole picture. 
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Happiness, then, is the unimpeded pursuit of the intel-
lectual life in the knowledge and possession of immortal truth -
unimpeded because it has been unshackled from error and mental 
sloth by the incorporation of the moral and intellectual virtues 
It is the only occupation of man that is truly worthy of his 
nature. It is, too, the only activity that is most self-suffi-
cient and independent of the other needs of life. To be able 
to withdraw from all the confusion of everyday life and to 
concentrate on the things that are noble and ennobling is 
claimed by Aristotle to be the peak of human attainment. This 
activity is the only one which can take man out of himself and 
raise him to the level of divinity. 
Whether it be reason or something else 
that is this element Which is thought 
to be our na tural ruler and gu ide and 
to take thought of things noble end di-
vine, whether it be itself also divine 
_______________ Qr_Q~ly the most divine element in us, 
S ~~. 1141b , 2. Cf. also 1141&, 19. 
the activity of this in accordance with 
its proper virtue will be perfect happiness. 7 
Therefore the activity of God, which sur-
passes all others in blessedness, must 
be contemplative; and of human activities, 
therefore, that which is most akin to this 
must be most of the nature of kappiness. 8 
But such a life would be too high for man; 
for it is not in so far as he is man that 
he will live so, but in so far as something 
divine is present in him. 9 
Once again Greek thought has made happiness a gerov ~L ald 
into the word £o6al~ovta injected the ancient and original 
meaning of a god-given gift (eo-6aio~aL). 
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To one the least bit acquainted with Catholic philo-
sophical thought, many of these statements will ~pear truisms, 
but the fact is that they are giant strides toward perfect 
truth. Aristotle, in unison with Plato, claims for man kin-
Ship with God by participation in tntelligence. The;soulof 
man endowed with intellect is become an image of God in a way 
that, as far as man's nature can demand, is perfect. In the 
second last quotation, Aristotle reaches the ultimate in the 
natural know&edge of God. True, there are refinements he has 
overlooked, but to say that contemplation in God surpasses all 
other activities in blessedness takes man to the threshold of 
revelation. The next step is the knowledge of the Trinity. 
For in this contemplation, the knowledge of God in contem-
7 Ibid. 1177R, 13. 
8 Ibid. 1178b , 21. 
9 Ibid. 1177b , 25. 
plating himself generates the Son, and the love between the 
two is the spiration of the Holy Ghost. We could never ex-
pect Aristotle to attain this conclusion, but we must make 
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note of the intelligence of a pagan which is so nearly Catholic. 
Aristotle feels tlmt he has done a slight injustice to 
the opinions of certain people by rejecting pleasure as the 
synonym for happiness. Realizing men are undoubtedly seeking 
pleasure, he finds a place for pleasure in happiness. Not the 
pleasures of the sense, to be sure, but the pleasures of the 
soul. Happiness, he insists, is not defined by pleasure. But 
happiness does have an accidens proprium, a quality that is 
not of the essence of happiness but which is so closely con-
nected with happiness, that where happinews is, pleasure must 
also be. 
Vfuether, then, the perfect and supremely 
happy man has one or more activities, the 
pleasures that perfect these will be said 
in the strict sense to be pleasures proper 
to man, and the rest will be so in a secon-
dary ~Bd fractional way, as are the activi-
ties. 
It seems out of place to criticize a system so well 
formulatea and so close to actual truth. But it is necessary 
to point out a few flaws in a doctrine so well articulated. 
They are minor ones but, nevertheless, they leave the doctrine 
incomplete. Aristotle seems to pass over a difficulty that 
10 Ibid. 1177b , 31. 
49 
Plato had foreseen. Supposing a man really achieves the 
heights that Aristotle postulates. There is still;lacking com-
plete self-sufficiency, and consequently an essential note 
of happiness. Aristotle seems to claim that man will approach 
this complete severance from all extrinsic aids as a mathema-
tician would speakof one line approaching Slother line as a 
limit. But there must be complete independence. Hence, in 
this present life, where man is always dependent upon some com-
fort, upon food, friendship, social relations, these always 
manage to disturb the quiet of contemplation. 
Secondly, not even the greatest minds can completely 
fathom truth; and there must always be an unsatisfied desire 
to know more. At the s~e time there will be the disquieting 
knowledge and conviction that something will mar the contem-
plation, at least deathl 
As has been said, Plato foresaw this difficulty and for 
this reason remained unsettled in his conclusion. The final 
words of the Philebus reveal this disturbing thought: 
Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown 
than the insufficiency of both of them 
[wisdom and pleasure] ••••• In this argument 
the claims of both of pleasure and mind 
to be the absolute good have alike been set 
aside, because they have both failed in 
self-sufficiency or adequacy or perfec-
tion.ll 
Another difficulty ought to be proposed. According to 
----------~---------
11 Philebus: 67a. 
Aristotle's demands, the state of happiness can be acquired 
by only a few men. The rest of man*kind would have to go 
along suffering hardships and trials to end up without having 
acquired their final end and, What is more, being incapable 
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of acquiring it. They would have an existence the end of which 
was impossible of attainment. This is contrary to Aristotle's 
idea because he insists, in his criticism of Plato, that the 
end must be capable of attainment. He would have to admit that 
most of the human race would enter life, live in it, and pass 
out of it without ever having acquired the state of happiness. 
Then there could not be the application of his own principle, 
o~eev yap ~4~~v ~ ~uo,~ ~o,er. 
One final step would have eliminated the whole difficulty 
a step which Aristotle comes close to taking, but which is never 
definitely made - the immortality of the soul. Had he included 
this last step, there could have been no reason for complaint. 
It would have been a simple thing for him to put happiness into 
the life of the soul after death, where there would have been 
no need of food, clothing, companions, justice, passions, or 
all the things that disturb. There would have been a perfect 
self-sufficiency, as well as that continued possession of hap-
piness without fear of losing it. There would have been, too, 
the possibility of everybody's attaining that ultimate end 
by the pursuit of virtue while dwelling in this human habitation 
There must necessarily be a note of regret that neither 
he nor Plato concluded to such a rational statement. They 
both had in their body of thought all the ground for making 
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such a conclusion. They were highly tempted to; and they had 
the conviction of mankind leaning in that direction. But what 
stopped them is just a matter of conjecture. It is not en easy 
thing, nor a logical thing, to say that they purposely refrained 
from the conclusion. The best e~lanation seems to be man's 
fallible intellect, hampered by what these men devoted their 
lives to ostracize from society, the pull made by fallen nature 
against man's true nature. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Aristotle: Metaphysics, edited by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1924. 
: Nicomachean Ethics, edited by I. Bywater. Oxford: 
----------Clarendon Press, 1913. 
52 
__________ : Politics, edited by Newman. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Burnet, Jolin: The Ethics of Aristotle. London: Methuen & Co., 
1900:-Pp Ii & 502. 
Demos, Raphael: ~ Philosophy of Plato. New York: Scribners, 
1931. pp xiv & 406. 
Donaldson, J.W.: Pindar's Epinician or Triumphal Odes in four 
books. Cambridge: University Press, 18~pp lxvii & 
559. 
Festugiere, A.J.: Contemplation et Vie Contemplative Selon 
Platon. Paris: Libraire Pfiflosophique J. Vrin, 1937. 
pp 493. 
Greenwood, L.H.L.: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. vi. 
Cambridge: University Press, 1909. pp 207 & 14. 
Grote, George: Aristotle, 3rd. ed. London: J. Murray, 1883. 
pp xvi & 682. 
Grube, G.M.A.: Plato's Thought. London: Methuen & Co., 1935. 
pp xvii & 320. 
Herodotus: Historiae, edited by Charles Hude in 2 vols. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1908. 
Homer: Iliad, edited by Walter Leaf, 2nd. ed. London: MacMillan, 
1900 - '02. 
: Odyss~, edited by W.W. Merry and D.B. Monro in 2 
----------vols. Oiford: Clarendon Press, 1899 - 1901. 
Romerus: Homeric Hymns, edited by T.W. Allen & E.E. Sikes: Lon-
don: MaCMillan, 1904. ;; lxxviii, 330. 
Jaeger, w.: Aristoteles: GrUndlei92g einer Geschichte Seiner 
EntwicklunE. Berlin, 9 3. Translated by R. Robin-
son under the title, Aristotle: Fundamentals of the 
HistOry of TIl! Development. -- ---
Jebb, Sir Richard: Sophocles: The Plays ~ Fra8D!ents wi th 
Critical Notes, Commentary, and Translation in Eng-
~ Prose l Part III: the Antigone. Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 1906. 3rd. ed. pp 288. 
Jowett, B.: The Dialogues of Plato Translated Into English, in 
4 vols. New York:-Scribner's & Sons,-ysg~. 
Mure, G.R.G.: Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press, 
1932. xl &: 282. 
53 
Plato: Platonis ~era, in 5 vols., edited by J. Burnet. Oxford: 
Claren n Press, 1902 - '06. 
Ritter, Constantin: Kern~edanken der Platonischen Philosophie. 
Munich, 1932. ranslatealDy Adam Aller under the 
title, The Essence of Plato's Philosop~ New York: 
The Diar-Press, 1933. pp 413. . 
Robinson, Thomas: BZIOAOY TOY AZKPAIOY TA EYPIZKOMENA • Hesiodi 
Ascraei ~uae Supersunt, cum Notis Variorim, e Theatro 
Sheldoniano, Oxonii, 173~pp 496. 
Roland-Gosselin, M.D.: Aristote. Lagny-S-Marne: Emmanuel Gri-
oin, 1928. pp 204. 
Ross, W.D.: Aristotle, 3rd. ed. London: Methuen & Co., 193'7. 
pp vii &: 300. 
__________ : Th~ Works of Aristotle translated ~ English, 
in 11 volsl, 1st. ed. London: Oxford University Press, 
1925. 
Stewart, John A.: Notes On The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, 
in 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892:-pp ix &: 539. 
: Plato's Doctrine of Ideas. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
--------~1909. pp 206. --
Thomas Aquinas, St.: In De,cem Libros Ethicorum Aria tote1is Ad 
Nicomachum ~position, edited by Pirotta-Gl11et. 
Turin: Mariotti~ 1934. pp xxiv &: '74'7. 
__________ : Summa Theologica, edited by Louis Guerin, 18'73. 
54 
Thucyaides: Works with an English Translation by Charles F. 
Smith in 4 vo1s. (Loeb Classics series) London: 
Heinemann, 1919 - '23. 
Wilson, J.C.: Aristotelian Studies f, ~. !li. Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1879. pp 81. 
Zeller, Eduard: Aristote1es und die A1ten Peripatetiker, 4th. 
ed. Berlin, 1921. Translated by B.F.C. Costelloe and 
J.H. Muirhead. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897. 
2 vo1s. pp xi & 520; viii & 512. 
: Grundriss der Geschichte der Grieschichen Phi10so-
----------phie, 13th. ed., revised by-w7 Nestle. Leipzig, 1928. 
Translated by L.R. Palmer under the title, Outlines 
of the History of Greek Philosophy. London: Paul, 
French, Teubner & Co.; New York: Harcourt, Br~e & 
Co., 1931. pp xv & 324. 
